Tax Bases, Tax Rates and the Elasticity of Reported Income by Wojciech Kopczuk
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
TAX BASES, TAX RATES AND








I am grateful to seminar participants at UBC, Columbia, Berkeley and Stanford, Joel Slemrod, David Green
and Kevin Milligan for comments on an earlier draft, Emmanuel Saez for help with the data and to Daniel
Feenberg for his help with the TAXSIM program. Financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada and the UBC Hampton Fund is gratefully acknowledged.  The views expressed
herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
©2003 by Wojciech Kopczuk.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may
be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Tax Bases, Tax Rates and the Elasticity of Reported Income
Wojciech Kopczuk
NBER Working Paper No. 10044
October 2003
JEL No. H2, H4, H31, J22, K34
ABSTRACT
Tax reforms usually change both tax rates and tax bases. Using a panel of income tax returns
spanning the two major U.S. tax reforms of the 1980s and a number of smaller tax law changes, I
find that the elasticity of income reported on personal income tax returns depends on the available
deductions. This highlights that this key behavioral elasticity is not a structural parameter but rather
that it can be to some extent controlled by policy makers. The results suggest that base broadening
reduces the marginal efficiency cost of taxation. The point estimates indicate that the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 reduced the marginal cost of collecting a dollar of tax revenue by 2 cents, with roughly
half of this reduction due to the base broadening and the other half due to the tax rate reduction. As
a by-product, the analysis in this paper offers a reconciliation of disparate estimates obtained by
previous studies of the tax responsiveness of income.
Wojciech Kopczuk
Columbia University
420 West 118th Street, Rm. 1022 IAB
New York, NY 10027
and NBER
wkopczuk@nber.org1 Motivation
Complexity is often considered to be an undesirable feature of the tax system, but this is
usually postulated rather than derived from an economic model and its relationship to other
criteria for evaluating tax policy is unclear. A recent paper of Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002)
oﬀers a formalized treatment of the impact of non-tax rate instruments that are controlled
by policy makers. In particular, their analysis provides a speciﬁc framework for analyzing
the cost of complexity in the tax system by interpreting it in terms of the income tax base.
A simple income tax is characterized by few deductions and, therefore, a broad tax base.
Broadening the tax base increases revenue and aﬀects administrative costs, but more subtly
it is also likely to aﬀect the excess burden of taxation: in their model, a broader tax base is
associated with a lower elasticity of taxable income and therefore with lower excess burden.
Thus, in that framework, simplicity of the tax system directly aﬀects the eﬃciency cost of
taxation.
In this paper, I evaluate the empirical value of such arguments by estimating the impact
of the tax base, measured as a fraction of income subject to taxation, on the elasticity of
income reported on personal tax returns. This elasticity is the key parameter necessary
to evaluate the deadweight loss of the income tax. My results highlight though that it is
not a structural parameter, but instead it depends on a non-rate aspect of the tax system
(tax base) that can be manipulated by policy makers. This eﬀect is not just theoretically
possible, it also turns out to be empirically relevant. Consequently, the results indicate that
the marginal deadweight loss of taxation can be controlled by policy makers. In particular,
and as an illustration, I can assess potential eﬃciency gains resulting from a change to a
broad-base low-rate tax system.
2 Context
The central importance of the elasticity of taxable income for public ﬁnance questions follows
from two simple realizations. First, by the envelope theorem, the marginal tax rate (t)
aﬀects welfare of an individual in proportion to her taxable income (I). The analytics of
the response are irrelevant. Second, with just income taxation in place,1 the marginal eﬀect
on revenue is t∂I
∂t +I, again depending only on the total taxable income. Therefore, having
a measure of the responsiveness of I is crucial for any attempt to measure the eﬃciency
cost of income taxation.2 What is the relevant I? The traditional approach was to deﬁne
I ≡ wL, where w is the wage rate and L is labor supply. Under this assumption, the
1In the presence of other taxes, the impact on other sources of revenue should be accounted for as well.
One important example of such a response is income shifting between personal and corporate income tax
bases.
2See Feldstein (1999) and Slemrod (1998) for discussions of this argument and its limitations.
1elasticity of labor supply can be used in place of the elasticity of taxable income. Apart
from disregarding many forms of capital income subject to income taxation, this approach
also ignores other potentially important types of response to taxation such as unobserved
eﬀort, tax avoidance, tax evasion and income shifting.
In order to address this concern, following Lindsey (1987) and Feldstein (1995), the
literature has concentrated directly on income reported on tax returns (Auten and Car-
roll, 1999; Carroll, 1998; Goolsbee, 1999; Long, 1999; Sillamaa and Veall, 2001; Aarbu and
Thoreson, 2001; Gruber and Saez, 2002).3 Several authors argued that changes in the deﬁ-
nition of taxable income provide an additional source of identiﬁcation as exogenous limiting
or expanding of deductions pushes taxpayers into diﬀerent tax brackets. Understanding
consequences of such changes is important, because they occur at exactly the same time
that the tax rates change. An implicit assumption in the literature is that such changes do
not have an independent eﬀect on income and that the elasticity of response to marginal
tax rates is not aﬀected by them. This assumption is very strong. For example, the elimi-
nation of the non-itemizer charitable deduction by the TRA’86 changed the relative price of
charitable contributions and might have had an independent eﬀect on income. Similarly, a
change in the standard deduction aﬀects the decision to itemize and, through this channel,
the relative prices of itemizable activities for taxpayers who change their itemization status.
The eﬀect stressed in this paper is that a change in the price of deductions, or more
generally the price of legal avoidance or illegal evasion, is going to aﬀect the potential
behavioral elasticities. As argued by Slemrod (1994), taxable income is going to be more
responsive when reducing it is cheap (e.g., because deductions are abundant), and it will
be less responsive when it is expensive. This eﬀect is conceptually separate from any eﬀect
on the level of taxable income and has far-reaching policy implications. Because behavioral
elasticities measure the extent of excess burden, a policy that can aﬀect the elasticities
can also determine the extent of ineﬃciency of taxation. Understanding the empirical
relevance of such policies is important from the optimal policy design perspective (Slemrod
and Kopczuk, 2002). It may also be important from the political economy point of view.
To appreciate possible implications, note that in the presence of these sorts of eﬀects,
supporters of the limited role of the government may have an incentive to pursue policies
that make the tax system less eﬃcient (and vice versa).
That income elasticity is a non-structural parameter may already be suspected based
on the existing empirical literature. Gruber and Saez (2002) ﬁnd that elasticities for high-
income individuals are bigger than for the rest. Saez (2003) argues that only the responses
in the upper tail of the income distribution are signiﬁcant. Higher elasticities have been
found for itemizers Gruber and Saez (2002) and those who are self-employed (Sillamaa and
Veall, 2001). Saez (2003) also ﬁnds that responses to diﬀerent tax reforms appear radically
3See Slemrod (1998) for a critical discussion of this literature.
2diﬀerent: he found the evidence of signiﬁcant responses to the TRA’1986 but not much
action surrounding the Kennedy tax cut in the mid-1960s. While it is in principle possible
that behavioral elasticities vary systematically with some personal characteristics,4 it is
also possible that diﬀerences in behavior result from diﬀerences in the tax and institutional
environment faced by diﬀerent individuals.
To address this issue, I concentrate on the behavior of a broad measure of income5
and control for both changes in tax rates and rules. Measuring rules is of course diﬃcult
and it may explain why this issue has not yet been addressed. Even if this problem is
somehow resolved, an additional daunting problem from the econometric point of view is
to have enough variation in any such measure to credibly identify the potential eﬀects.
In practice, time-variation alone is unlikely to provide such a source of variation. The
framework considered in this paper is stylized, but it allows to obtain a quantiﬁable measure
of the non-rate aspects of the tax system in place that varies both over time and in the
cross-section. The idea is to use the tax base as a summary statistic for tax rules in place.
I rely on the taxpayer-speciﬁc measure of the size of the tax base: the ratio of income that
ends up being taxable to total income. This is an easily observable quantity that is aﬀected
by tax reforms in a mechanical way (although it of course varies also due to endogenous
taxpayers’ responses). Tax reforms induce variation in both tax rates and tax bases and
therefore provide the opportunity to separately identify the two eﬀects.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In the next section, I describe a simple model
that highlights the role of the tax base and underlies the empirical speciﬁcation. I present
details of the empirical implementation and discuss the data in Section 4. Apart from the
proposed instrumental variable approach, the key question is how to control for trends in
inequality and transitory components of income. Two issues are of interest in that context:
the choice of control variables and the choice of sample used in analysis. In particular, I
argue that diﬀerent sample choices were responsible for diﬀerences in the results found in
the previous literature (Section 5). Following this discussion, I present my estimates of the
elasticity of income and the strength of its dependence on the tax base (Section 6).
The major contributions of this analysis lie in demonstrating that the elasticity of re-
ported income is not a primitive parameter and in identifying the strength of its dependence
on a particular administrative instrument of the tax base. It turns out that the elasticity of
taxable income varies systematically with the tax base and that this eﬀect is quantitatively
important. This result indicates that the eﬃciency cost of taxation is a function of tax
4For example, more tax responsive individuals may pursue occupations that allow for easier avoidance,
so that they are overrepresented among self-employed.
5My broad income is the measure of all kinds of income reported on the tax returns that can be consistently
observed over time. The alternative would be to use a measure of taxable income. This would be preferred
from the theoretical point of view. Such a measure is easy to obtain, but because its deﬁnition changes
frequently it is diﬃcult to incorporate in the analysis.
3rules. It also turns out that the results are similar for diﬀerent income categories suggesting
that the major aspects of tax environment relevant for taxpayers’ decision are appropriately
controlled for. The ﬁnal section discusses some implications of these results.
3 Income Response to Tax Base Changes
Suppose that an individual has the total income of Y that can be received in the form
reported on the personal income tax return (B) or in the form that is not included on
the personal tax return (F). Examples of B are wages, salaries, dividends, interests, self-
employment income etc. Examples of F are fringe beneﬁts, deferred compensation schemes,
funds retained within a corporation, etc.6 Without any frictions, F would be the preferred
form of compensation. I assume though that substitution from B to F entails the cost of
M(F).7 While F remains oﬀ the tax return and is not observable, the broad income (B)
is observed. Taxable income is obtained from the broad income by excluding certain non-
taxable components, subtracting income adjustments, deductions, exemptions and so on. I
assume that deductions, adjustments and non-taxable components can be expressed as G·D,
where D is a typical deductible commodity and G is the number of deductible commodities.
For example, non-itemizers with no adjustments to income would have G = 0, while others
would have G > 0. I denote by ¯ S the applicable standard deduction. Consequently, the
total after-tax income C may be expressed as
C = F + B − t(B − GD − ¯ S) − M(F), (1)
where Y = F + B and t is the marginal tax rate (I will also use τ ≡ 1 − t to denote the
net-of-tax rate). Assuming that M(F) is not aﬀected by the tax reform, the tax system
aﬀects behavior through t, ¯ S, and G. The budget constraint highlights that the tax rate
has two independent eﬀects. First, it determines the relative price of F and B, which is τ.
Second, it determines the relative price of B and D. The latter eﬀect is proportional to G.
If G did not vary, the estimated tax elasticity of B would reﬂect the combination of these
two eﬀects. However, when G varies, there is no single tax elasticity, so that estimating it
is not a well-posed problem. The value of G is aﬀected by tax reforms that eliminate or
introduce deductions and adjustments. Additionally, G varies cross-sectionally: it depends
on such things as the itemization status (which is chosen by the taxpayer), health shocks
(that inﬂuence whether medical expenses exceed the ﬂoor for claiming deductions), home
ownership (via mortgage deductions), taxes imposed by state and local governments, etc.
From equation 1 it is evident that G aﬀects individual incentives only through its inter-
action with the marginal tax rate. Indeed, if the tax rate was equal to zero, G would have
6I assume that deﬁnitions of B and F are not aﬀected by reforms.
7See, for example, Mayshar (1991) and Slemrod (2001) for the analysis of individual behavior with this
kind of avoidance technology.
4no eﬀect. This suggests that it makes sense to pursue an empirical speciﬁcation in which
both the tax rate and its interaction with G would be controlled for. However, measuring G
explicitly is not practical. To motivate the proposed solution, consider the following setup
that abstracts from sheltering but models the role of deductions. Let Di, i = 1,··· ,N
be commodities. Assume that the utility function is separable between these consumption
goods and determinants of the broad income (such as labor supply), and that the utility
from consumption is given by
v(D1,··· ,DN), (2)
where v(·) is symmetric (formally, it is assumed that for any vector D and its permutation
P(D), v(D) = v(P(D))). Denote the generic relative price of broad income B by w and the
price of good i by pi. In the interest of simplifying the notation, assume that in the absence
of taxes all prices are equal to 1. Expenditures on G (G < N) commodities are deductible
from income. Due to the assumed symmetry, without any loss of generality, deductions
may be taken to be the ﬁrst G commodities. Therefore, the after-tax prices are given by
w = τ, pi = τ for i ≤ G and pi = 1 for i > G. The demand for B is a function of all
prices and the non-earned income. The elasticity of B with respect to the net-of-tax rate
has to reﬂect the impact of all relative prices that are aﬀected by the change. In order to
incorporate nonlinear tax schedules, I additionally allow for varying virtual income R (so































The last step makes use of the assumed symmetry of all deductible commodities. This for-
mula depends on G, the number of deductible commodities which is unlikely to be observed.
























where the superscript “∗” denotes the compensated eﬀect. The ﬁrst two terms form the
compensated elasticity of B with respect to the tax rate: it depends on the elasticity with
respect to own price w as in the standard analysis, but it also depends on the cross elasticity
of deductible goods with respect to w multiplied by the share of deductible goods.
So far, the response to changes in G was ignored. However, it may be analyzed in a
similar manner. Consider an increase in G by ∆G (the case of a decrease would be analyzed
identically). It corresponds to prices of goods G+1 to G+∆G falling from 1 to τ. Therefore,



























Combining equation 4 and 5 provides an expression for the response of broad income to
a change in the economic environment. To express it succinctly, deﬁne γ ≡ GD
B . Then,
when evaluated at the original point, ∆(γ ln(τ)) = D∆G
B ln(τ) + γ∆ln(τ). Consequently,














where ∆T is a change in the tax liability.
This analysis has two important implications. First, the response to tax changes de-
pends on G. Second, the impact of deductions is measured by the cross-elasticity and it
is proportional to the (observable) share of deductions in the total income γ ≡ GD
B . This
suggests using a natural speciﬁcation where one controls for both the tax rate and its inter-





∂ ln(w) . Of course, γ is endogenous but it also reﬂects the exogenous parameter G. As long
as γ responds to changes in G, the two parameters can be separately identiﬁed.
Without assuming that the utility function is symmetric, it can be demonstrated that



















where D = G−1 PG
i=1 Di. What is required for ∆γ ln(τ) to measure the eﬀect of de-








∂ ln(w) : the marginal deductible
commodity should react to the price of leisure as the average one does. This assumption is
implicit in the empirical work that follows.
Motivated by the model, therefore, instead of measuring G explicitly, I rely on the share
of broad income that is spent on non-taxable commodities γ ≡ GD
B , and I control for both
τ and its interaction with the tax base γ. Note that γ is aﬀected by tax reforms through
their mechanical eﬀect on G. On the other hand, γ also varies in the cross-section. My goal
is to estimate parameters ε and β of the following generic speciﬁcation
ln(B) = εln(τ) + βγ ln(τ) + other terms. (7)
In this speciﬁcation, ε is the elasticity that would prevail if γ = 0, i.e. if no deductions
were available. The actual size of the elasticity is ε + βγ: if policy aﬀects γ, it changes
6this elasticity. The interpretation of β that follows from the model described above is as th
average cross-elasticity of deductible goods with income, so that both positive and negative
βs are consistent with the theory. More generally, any response of broad income will also
reﬂect reallocation of income between reported and non-reported forms.
Because γ has never been, to my knowledge, considered in the literature, it should be
pointed out that from both the theoretical and the econometric point of view this variable
can be thought of in the same way as the marginal tax rate. This quantity is aﬀected by
policy changes and it constitutes a parameter of the taxpayer’s problem just as the tax rate
does. It is clearly endogenous as well, but that will be dealt with in the empirical work just
like any potential endogeneity of tax rates must be dealt with.
It also should be stressed that speciﬁcations I consider do not include the direct (i.e.,
not interacted with the tax rate) eﬀect of the tax base. This is because changes in the tax
base have any impact only to the extent that an individual is subject to taxation to begin
with. The real restrictions imposed in the analysis are due to assuming a speciﬁc functional
form of the interaction of the rate and the base and due to the assumption that rules are
fully characterized by the single parameter γ.
4 Data and Empirical Strategy
The data I use in this paper comes from a panel of tax returns. Before it is described in
Section 4.2, I brieﬂy discuss prior approaches to identifying the eﬀect of taxes on taxable
income focusing on my proposed modiﬁcations, including those necessary to simultaneously
identify the eﬀect of the tax base.
The identiﬁcation problems in this setup have been discussed extensively by Moﬃtt and
Wilhelm (2000). The impact of unobservable demographic characteristics whose eﬀect stays
constant over time and that are time-invariant can be eliminated by ﬁrst-diﬀerencing the
regression speciﬁcation. Therefore, indexing individuals by i and denoting the time index
by s, I specify my model in the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced form as
∆ln(Bis) = ε∆ln(τis) + β∆[γis ln(τis)] + η∆ln(Bis − Tis) + ∆δvZv
i + δh∆Zh
s + ∆θis , (8)
where τ is the marginal net-of-tax rate, γ is the share of deductible consumption, T is the
total tax liability and Z = [Zh,Zv] is the vector of other relevant characteristics. The
objective is to directly estimate the elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate τ ≡ 1 − t.
For the reasons discussed above, the tax elasticity depends on deductions and therefore the
coeﬃcient on ln(τ) is allowed to depend on γ. This is the minimal extension of speciﬁcations
considered in the prior literature that allows for testing the constancy of the elasticity. The
parameter ε is the broad income tax elasticity when γ = 0, that is for the comprehensive
tax base. Equivalently, this is the response of broad income motivated by substitution away
7from items reported on the tax return toward leisure, fringe beneﬁts and other types of
income. One can test whether β = 0, in which case there is a single tax elasticity. In
principle, depending on whether deductible goods are substitutes or complements for the
broad income, both positive and negative β’s are consistent with the theory. The parameter
η measures the income eﬀect. Finally, Zv is the set of time-invariant variables whose eﬀect
changes over time and Zh is the set of time-speciﬁc variables whose eﬀect stays constant
over time.
All reported regressions include dummies for the single marital status, sex (these are
Zv’s) and the full set of year eﬀects (Zh). The dataset contains no age information, but
observe that linear age eﬀects are controlled for by including year dummies in the ﬁrst-
diﬀerenced speciﬁcation. The eﬀect of any other variables is not controlled for and they are
subsumed in the ∆θ term.
4.1 Endogeneity and Instruments
As in any econometric analysis of the impact of taxes on income or labor supply, one has to
worry about endogeneity of the key right-hand side variables. Both the marginal tax rate
and the tax base depend on the realization of income. The tax rate is the direct function
of the total income. The tax base is not a direct function of income, but it may depend on
it. Furthermore, given that only limited demographic information is present in the dataset,
one has to worry about any systematic relationship of omitted variables that are relevant
for income with the tax base. For example, people with temporarily high income may be
willing to invest more in tax avoidance. On the other hand, people with temporarily low
income due to, e.g., medical conditions will have a lower tax base as they qualify for the
medical deduction. The tax base is, similarly as the marginal tax rate, an endogenous
time-varying variable, exogenously aﬀected by policy shocks.
To consistently estimate ε and γ, what is necessary are instruments for ∆ln(τis) and
∆{γis ln(τis)} that are uncorrelated with ∆θis. I construct and use as my instruments the
predicted changes in the values of ln(τ) and γ ln(τ).8 Only information as of time s is used
to construct the predictions of the time s + 1 variables. In other words, the predicted tax
base and the predicted marginal tax rate diﬀer from the original ones only to the extent that
there were changes in tax law. This eliminates the eﬀect of behavioral response between time
s and time s+1, although it still leaves the individual-speciﬁc component. In constructing
the predicted tax base, I account for changes in the medical deduction,9 changes in the tax
8In general and apart from the orthogonality assumptions, with just two years of data what is required
for identiﬁcation of both parameters is that the eﬀect of at least two of the variables used in computing the
marginal tax rate and tax base stayed constant over time so that they don’t enter speciﬁcation (8). With
multiple years of data and multiple tax reforms, this assumption can be somewhat weakened: I can still
identify the eﬀect if trends by at least two characteristics stayed constant over time.
9Until 1982, medical expenses above 3% of AGI were deductible, until 1986 - above 5%, after 1987 -
8treatment of charitable contributions by non-itemizers (a deduction was present between
1982 and 1986), deductibility of interests on personal debt that was phased out after 1986,
changes in the IRA limits, the elimination of the second-earner deduction by TRA86 and
the change in the treatment of moving expenses (the TRA’86 changed their status from an
adjustment to an itemized deduction). As a part of the process, the predicted itemization
status is determined by comparing predicted deductions with the corresponding standard
deduction. All calculations are CPI-adjusted and thus account for changes in itemization
incentives due to “bracket-creep.” Performance of the predicted tax base is illustrated in
Figure 1 using the 1985 data to predict the 1988 values (this change is mostly due to the
Tax Reform Act of 1986).
The marginal tax rate instrument is constructed analogously. I adjust all period s
quantities for inﬂation and compute the period s measure of taxable income accounting for
changes in its deﬁnition. The new itemization status is predicted and the new tax schedule
is applied to the result.10 The income instrument is constructed as in Gruber and Saez
(2002): it is simply ln(Bs − TP
s /ps+1) − ln(Bs − Ts) where Ts is tax liability in period s,
TP
S is the tax liability predicted for period s + 1 by applying the tax law as of period s + 1
to the period-s values, and ps+1 is the inﬂation factor between periods 1 and 2. As was
the case with the other two instruments, the income instrument relies only on the values of
variables as of period 1.
Validity of Instruments. Are instruments based on the time s information likely to
be uncorrelated with the error term? Two reasons for the failure of this assumption have
received attention in the literature. The ﬁrst one is the regression to the mean eﬀect.
Transitory components of income cannot be diﬀerenced out. Because, by construction,
transitory components of income as of the ﬁrst period do enter instruments, this leads to a
violation of the orthogonality assumption. Carroll (1998) provides evidence that this eﬀect
is important. The second source, discussed by, e.g. Goolsbee (2000), has to do with trends
in inequality. There is extensive evidence that relative incomes of the rich were rising in
the 1970s and the 1980s. Failure to control for such (potential) non-tax trends will almost
certainly lead to a bias in the tax coeﬃcient given that changes in both tax rate and tax
base were not independent of income. To motivate the following discussion, suppose that
∆θ can be expressed as
∆θi,s ≡ θi,s+1 − θi,s = ξi,s+1 + (a − 1)λi,s + φi,s+1 ,
above 7.5%. There were minor changes regarding how health insurance aﬀects the calculation in 1982 and
1983.
10The results are not sensitive to variations in constructing the tax rate instrument that involve using
inﬂated capital gains as a component of the predicted income and not adjusting income for changes in the
deﬁnition.
9where ξi,s+1 is the income trend between period s and s + 1 for individual i, λi,s is the
transitory component of income in period s and a is the constant reﬂecting the degree of
its persistence,11 and φi,s+1 is the income innovation that is uncorrelated with any of the
period s variables. When dealing with the tax rate, the worry is that both ξi,s+1 and λi,s
are not independent of the time s income, although this is due to two distinct reasons. λi,s
is a component of income and its correlation with ln(Bis) is mechanical. In the presence
of diﬀerential trends by income groups, ξi,s+1 is correlated with the permanent income
(the group indicator), and through this channel it is correlated with ln(Bis). A correlation
between the error term and the initial income almost certainly invalidates the tax rate
instrument that is a function of income, even though it takes the form of ﬁrst diﬀerence.
Moﬃtt and Wilhelm (2000) suggested including income as of time s to control for
the regression to the mean eﬀect. This procedure can be understood by interpreting the
transitory income component λis as an omitted variable. Because the time-s income is
correlated with its transitory component, it can be used as a proxy for it. This procedure
has been accepted and used in most of the recent work (see e.g., Auten and Carroll, 1999;
Sillamaa and Veall, 2001; Gruber and Saez, 2002). Gruber and Saez (2002) appear to
suggest that this approach also addresses the inequality trend issue. In general, however,
one cannot control for the two omitted variables ξi,s+1 and λi,s using a single control variable
unless its relationship to the omitted variable can be reduced to the dependence on their
sum ξi,s+1 + (a − 1)λi,s.
Gruber and Saez (2002) experimented with ﬂexible spline income controls in the ﬁrst-
period income, and concluded that such nonlinearities are important. Allowing for nonlin-
earities in the level of income does not address the issue of two diﬀerent sources of correla-
tion, though. At the same time, nonlinearities in permanent income may be important to
appropriately control for unobservable trends (ξ).
Carroll (1998) constructs his instrument relying on a proxy for the permanent income.
The idea is that such an instrument should be uncorrelated with the transitory component
λi,s,12 but it is still likely correlated with ξi,s. Carroll (1998) does not control for the total
income, but in some speciﬁcations he controls for the initial (1989) income from ﬁnancial
assets (the sum of dividend and interest income). The latter is likely to be correlated with
both ξ and λ. As the result, this control variable will partly reﬂect residual correlations
with both of these variables and it is unlikely to appropriately control for ξ.
11When a = 1, shocks are permanent and, therefore, their impact will be eliminated by ﬁrst-diﬀerencing.
If a = 0 so that shocks die oﬀ after one period, the problem is most pronounced.
12His proxy for the permanent income is the average income between 1989 and 1995 and his empirical
strategy involves comparing 1989 and 1995 levels of income. This proxy may still be correlated with the
transitory component as of 1989.
10Strategy. The tax rate is a function of taxable income, and demographic characteristics
(such as the state of residence, marital status, number of dependents, or age). Eﬀectively
then, the tax rate is a function of broad income, the structure of deductions/adjustments
and demographic characteristics. In constructing the predicted tax base I rely on taxable
income, deductions and tax adjustments. As a result, the tax base is aﬀected by individual-
speciﬁc and transitory components present in each of them. As examples of such inﬂuences,
one might list tastes for charity (that aﬀect charitable contributions), own health status
(aﬀecting medical deduction), home ownership (aﬀecting real estate tax and home mort-
gage deductions), credit history (aﬀecting personal interest deductions) and unobservable
income shocks (aﬀecting state tax liability and, through this channel, the itemization sta-
tus). The eﬀect of the tax base on income can be identiﬁed to the extent that at least
some of these characteristics are either (1) time-invariant with their eﬀect staying constant
over time or (2) they do not independently aﬀect income (in which case they need not be
time-invariant). In either case, it implies that such characteristics can be excluded from
equation 8. Determinants of the tax base whose independent eﬀect on income is not diﬀer-
enced out may be subsumed by either the transitory eﬀect (λ) or the group-speciﬁc trend
(ξ). If these were the only sources of the correlation of the error term with the instruments,
the consistency of estimates would rest on these eﬀects being appropriately controlled for,
exactly as it does in the analysis of the tax rate eﬀects. Many individual characteristics can
be expected to fall in this category. For example, own health status is likely a determinant
of the transitory component of income while home ownership is likely closely related to
permanent income and the group-speciﬁc trend. The assumption that I make is that the
eﬀect of unobservable person-speciﬁc determinants of deductions that do not stay constant
over time is fully accounted for by λ and ξ.
Because I rely on instruments constructed using information as of time s, I must address
their possible correlation with both the group-speciﬁc trend (ξ) and the transitory income
component (λ). The above discussion suggests that I should include two additional control
variables to pacify the impact of ξ and λ. In order to control for ξ, I need a measure of the
individuals’ ranks in the income distribution. I will use for that purpose the level of income
as of the ﬁrst year (1979) of the twelve-year panel.13 I exclude the observations for 1979 from
the sample used for estimation. I deﬁne the transitory income component as the diﬀerence
between current and 1979 income. I use this variable to control for λ. I experiment with
the 10-piece splines in logarithms of both the 1979 income and the “transitory” component
13An alternative strategy would be to follow Carroll (1998) and construct a measure of permanent income
by averaging income over all years when the individual is observed the sample. This is problematic for two
reasons. First, such a permanent income measure will reﬂect any tax response. Second, it is unclear how it
should be constructed for the unbalanced panel. For a critique of the approaches based on lags of income
such as the one presented here and an alternative approach (in the context of charitable gifts) see Auten et
al. (2002).
11to allow for potential nonlinear eﬀects.14 Nonlinearity in the permanent component allows
me to account for trends in income varying across diﬀerent income classes. In principle,
the transitory component can be controlled for in a linear fashion. However, because my
measure of the temporary income is a proxy and therefore certainly includes a measurement
error, allowing for higher-order eﬀects may aid in eliminating the residual correlation and
the resulting bias.
4.2 Data
I use the Statistics of Income/University of Michigan panel of tax returns that were selected
every year between 1979 and 1990, according to the last four digits of the social security
number. There are usual pros and cons of relying on the data from tax returns: the dataset
contains little demographic information, but it includes detailed information about tax
returns. The latter is crucial here, because it allows for constructing a measure of the tax
base.15
I follow Gruber and Saez (2002) in comparing diﬀerences between observations three
years apart. In other words, when diﬀerencing, I subtract observations for 1979 (1980,
1981,...,1987) from the corresponding observations for 1982 (1983, 1984,...,1990). The three
year spread was also used by Feldstein (1995). Using a longer spread allows for estimating
the permanent elasticity, while short-term diﬀerences can be signiﬁcantly aﬀected by income
shifting over time. Using a much longer spread would confound the eﬀects of ERTA’81 and
TRA’86 that were just ﬁve years apart. For example, the four-year window would include
the 1982-1986 pair that adjoins both of the major tax reforms.
The panel is not balanced. There are almost 300,000 observations that translate into
close to 100,000 three-year diﬀerences, but not all observations are used in the analysis.
Unless otherwise stated, the sample for estimation is selected as follows. For reasons dis-
14This strategy does not fully eliminate current income diﬀerences as a source of identiﬁcation, contrary
to the speciﬁcation of Gruber and Saez (2002) who allowed for ﬂexible splines in the current income. To see
that, note that I allow income to enter as S1(y − y79) + S2(y79) where y is the logarithm of current income,
y79 is the logarithm of 1979 income and S1,S2 are 10-piece linear spline functions (i.e., continuous functions
linear within deciles of the distribution of the argument). Only in special cases (such as S1 being linear) is
it possible to disentangle the eﬀect of y and y79. The identiﬁcation from this source therefore arises to the
extent that the distribution of the transitory component of the tax rate (i.e., generated by transitory income
shocks) is not independent of permanent income. Absent an economic argument for including current income
explicitly, this is a desirable feature of my speciﬁcation.
15There is one practical concern: as elaborated earlier, the instrument for tax base that I use is the
predicted change in tax base. Constructing it is a feasible task when deductions are removed but it is not
possible to be done exactly when they are introduced. The ERTA’81 introduced several new deductions, so
that predicting post-1981 tax base for pre-reform data exactly is not feasible. Still, an instrument relying
only on the pre-existing deductions remains a valid instrumental variable as long as it remains correlated
with actual tax base.
12cussed earlier, I use only post-1979 observations of individuals who are observed in 1979
and whose marital status in 1979 and the considered year is identical. There are 54,374
such three-year diﬀerences. Additionally, I exclude those who claim the age exemption in
either of the two years (9,932), those ﬁling as the “head of household” (2,674), those with
non-positive income in 1979 or either year of the pair (540), those whose state of residence
is unknown (33) 16 and some tax returns with missing data. This procedure leaves 41,442
diﬀerenced observations.
Details of the deﬁnitions of variables are given in the appendix. The major issue is
the deﬁnition of the left-hand side variable. The ideal variable to use would be taxable
income, but its deﬁnition changes with the tax reforms. As a result, researchers have made
compromises by accounting only for these components of taxable income that are observed
before and after the reforms. Various deﬁnitions have been used in practice. The prevailing
approach is to use a broad deﬁnition of income that includes all components of income
that were reported on tax returns under all considered tax regimes.17,18 As suggested in
Section 3, this is also the approach that is employed here. I construct and use as the
dependent variable the measure of broad income consisting of almost all income that had
to be reported every year, regardless of whether it was taxable or not.19 The only type of
income that is excluded (following most of the previous studies) are realized capital gains.
This is due to the lump-sum pattern of their realization.
Marginal tax rates and tax liabilities were computed by applying the NBER TAXSIM20
calculator to the actual AGI. Both state (ts) and federal income (tf) tax rates are used.
The eﬀective marginal tax rate is calculated as tf(1−ts)+ts for itemizers who claim state
tax deductions and as tf + ts for all others.
Spending on deductible commodities is deﬁned to include total adjustments to income,
16There is a small number of predominantly rich taxpayers whose state of residence is not reported in the
dataset (for conﬁdentiality reasons). For most of them, I do have information about their state of residence
in one of the prior years and this is what I use, implicitly assuming that they have not relocated in the
meantime.
17In practice (and here as well), capital gains are often excluded.
18Auten and Carroll (1999) and Gruber and Saez (2002) also considered stylized deﬁnitions of taxable
income. The deﬁnition of Auten and Carroll (1999) accounts for few deductions and thus it leads to result
similar as in the case of broad income. Gruber and Saez (2002) subtracted from the broad income some
of the itemized deductions using a constant deﬁnitions of applicable ﬂoors and limits. In the presence of
endogenous itemization decisions, deductions are not observed in all years for individuals who changed their
itemization status. Consequently, their estimated taxable income elasticities partly reﬂect the mechanical
eﬀect of disappearing deductions when individual is no longer itemizing (and vice versa).
19Reported nontaxable components include exempt dividends and interests (e.g., from municipal bonds)
and a part of unemployment insurance.
20The calculator is available at http://www.nber.org/taxsim/ and described in Feenberg and Coutts
(1993). It handles various features of the tax code including Earned Income Tax Credit and AMT. It also
allows for computing state tax rates.
13total deductions for itemizers, charitable deductions for non-itemizers between 1982 and
1986 and non-taxable but reported components of income (as in footnote 19). The value of γ
is deﬁned as the ratio of such spending to the broad income measure. Note that, consistently
with the model described earlier, inelastic exemptions and the standard deduction are not
a part of the deﬁnition of γ. For the purpose of constructing γ, deductions need not be
enumerated, because the tax base can be mechanically constructed by dividing the taxable
income observed on the return through a measure of the broad income. The extent and
sources of variation in γ will be discussed in what follows.
Table 1 shows basic summary statistics for the sample used in estimation. The average
reported income is about $45,000 dollars, compared to the average initial (i.e., 1979) income
of about $40,742 dollars. 32% of the population is single and 86% are males (virtually all
tax returns ﬁled by couples list male as a primary taxpayer). Slightly more than one half of
population itemizes. The average marginal tax rate for the whole sample is 26.4% in period
1 and 24.7% in period 2, while the tax base (1 − γ) in both periods is on average the same
at about 0.865.
4.3 Variation in the tax base.
There are two major aspects of the tax system that are responsible for determining the
broadness of the tax base. First, deductions and adjustments explicitly exclude parts of
income from taxation. As they vary, the tax base of the taxpayer varies. Second, tax bases of
itemizers and non-itemizers are diﬀerent. Changes in both the standard deduction and the
availability of itemized deductions aﬀect relative payoﬀs from being in diﬀerent itemization
regimes and, therefore, aﬀect the individual itemization status even in the absence of other
behavioral responses.
Importantly, the eﬀects of such changes vary also cross-sectionally . Changes in the
standard deduction aﬀect the itemization status (and therefore the tax base) only of those
individuals whose gains from itemization are small enough. The elimination of charitable
deduction for non-itemizers aﬀects the tax base of people making charitable contributions
but not of the others. Changes in the medical deduction aﬀect the tax base of itemizers
who have high enough medical expenses. These eﬀects can interact suggesting that the tax
base eﬀects are not simple functions of income (and, therefore, aiding in the identiﬁcation
of the eﬀect). For example, following the repeal of the pre-1986 non-itemizer deduction
for charitable contributions, a non-itemizer who relied on it may (but need not) change his
itemization status. If he does not change it, his tax base will increase. If he changes the
itemization status, his tax base will likely fall as deductions available to itemizers are taken
advantage of.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics showing the degree of variation of the key variables
over the years for the whole sample (note that this table is based on more observations than
14actually are used in the estimation — most importantly, only individuals observed in 1979
are used in the analysis). The temporal pattern indicates that tax reforms of the 1980’s
aﬀected the tax base. The tax base was falling before 1986 and was sharply increased by
the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Columns 7 and 8 show that the identical pattern is present
for both itemizers and non-itemizers. The proportion of itemizers sharply fell following the
TRA’86. If only standard deduction had changed, the remaining itemizers would be people
with relatively low tax base. Nevertheless, the average tax base among itemizers increased
sharply indicating that these changes were not simply caused by changes in the standard
deduction.
Column 8 of Table 2 shows that non-itemizers do not automatically have γ equal zero
(the tax base equal to one), although it is not far from that. The tax base of non-itemizers
was on average lower following the ERTA’81 mostly due to the availability of a deduction
for charitable contributions by non-itemizers. The cross-sectional changes are illustrated
in Figure 2. It shows the distribution of the tax base in 1980, 1982, 1985 and 1988 (only
individuals in the sample used for estimation are included). In every year, the distribution
is bimodal corresponding to groups of itemizers and non-itemizers. The ERTA’81 shifted
the whole distribution to the left, while the TRA’86 shifted it back to the right.
Table 3 shows mean changes and standard deviations of the key variables and instru-
ments for the three-year pairs used in estimation.
5 Results — Tax Rate Eﬀect Only
I begin by considering speciﬁcations that control only for the marginal tax rate and do
include the interaction of the marginal tax rate and the tax base. By doing so, I am able
to identify the source of diﬀerences in the results obtained in previous studies and present
directly corresponding estimates obtained using my approach. These estimates serve as a
reference point for the discussion of the role of tax base in the next section.
Income controls. In order to highlight the importance of the choice of income controls, I
present in Table 4 estimates of the tax coeﬃcient using the full sample and various means of
income controls.21,22 The ﬁrst speciﬁcation excludes income controls and leads to a signiﬁ-
cant negative coeﬃcient. The following two speciﬁcations are as in Gruber and Saez (2002):
21As discussed later, these speciﬁcations are not directly comparable to the results of Gruber and Saez
(2002) and Auten and Carroll (1999), because these papers additionally restrict samples used in estimation.
22All reported results come from the IV regressions. There is no evidence of the weak instrument problem
for the tax base and the tax rate instruments, although the income eﬀect instrument has low explanatory
power in some speciﬁcations. Estimates of the tax and base eﬀects are robust to not controlling for the
income eﬀect. Observations for the same individual can be present multiple times in my sample, so that I
report the Huber-White standard errors clustered by individuals that are robust to non-independence of the
error terms for the same individual (as well as heteroskedasticity). Only post-1979 observations are used.
15controlling for the current income has a huge impact, but allowing for nonlinearities reduces
the estimated elasticity to about 0.2. The same result was obtained by Gruber and Saez
(2002).
The following four speciﬁcations highlight the importance of both the permanent and
the transitory component of income. Controlling for just the transitory or just the per-
manent component has relatively little impact on the estimated elasticity, which remains
signiﬁcantly negative. This is so regardless of whether nonlinearity is allowed for. The last
panel allows for both types of income controls entering in diﬀerent combinations of linear
and nonlinear eﬀects. Allowing for nonlinear eﬀects in each case signiﬁcantly reduces the
estimated elasticity, as in Gruber and Saez (2002). However, even when both income con-
trols are allowed to enter in a nonlinear fashion, the estimated elasticity remains as high as
0.57. The ﬁnal speciﬁcation allows for separate nonlinear controls of transitory components
by year (deviations from 1979 income may include aggregate trends and life-cycle eﬀects),
and it shows that it has virtually no impact.
The second panel of Table 4 shows the results for married individuals only. Qualitatively,
the results are as sensitive to the choice of income controls as in the case of the full sample.
However, all of the estimated elasticities are smaller, although still signiﬁcant, when any
permanent-transitory mix of controls is used. The elasticity when splines in current income
are used is 0.12 and insigniﬁcant, while the elasticity when splines in 1979 income and
deviation from it are used is estimated at 0.26. The sensitivity of the results to restricting
the sample to married individuals only is further investigated in what follows.
Sample Selection. As discussed above, it is important to control for the mean reverting
components of income. Apart from controlling for the current level of income, earlier papers
also restricted their samples by excluding certain individuals with low incomes. Gruber and
Saez (2002) exclude “taxpayers whose income is below $10000 in year 1 [in 1992 dollars],
to avoid very serious mean reversion at the bottom of the income distribution.” Feldstein
(1995) excludes taxpayers with tax rates below 22 percent. Similarly, Auten and Carroll
(1999) limit their sample to “taxpayers with incomes at or above the threshold for the 22%
marginal tax rate in 1985.” Carroll (1998) excludes taxpayers with income below $50,000
in 1989 (approximately $56,000 of 1992 dollars).
By relying on the realized tax rate, the selection rule used by Feldstein (1995) and Auten
and Carroll (1999) likely excludes higher income individuals with low taxable income. These
papers ﬁnd larger elasticities than the other two papers that base their sample selection on
the income directly. That this is not a coincidence is illustrated in Table 5. I use the same
dataset as Gruber and Saez (2002). This dataset constitutes about 20% of the dataset used
by Auten and Carroll (1999). The rest of their sample oversamples rich individuals and
is not publicly available. They state that they obtain very similar results when they limit
16the sample to the public subset (p. 692, footnote 2). They analyze 1985-1989 diﬀerence
only. Because the Feldstein (1995) and Auten and Carroll (1999) restriction depends on
the tax system in place, I present the results for the 1985-1988 change only, using logarithm
of income in 1985 as a control for the mean reversion problem.23 Coeﬃcients estimated
based on the full sample are extremely large, suggesting that the mean reversion problem
at the bottom of the distribution may be indeed important. Using the Auten and Carroll
(1999) restriction to taxpayers with taxable income qualifying for at least 22% tax bracket
in 1985 brings the elasticity down to about 0.8.24 The Gruber and Saez (2002) restriction to
individuals with current income above $10K reduces the elasticity to less than 0.4,25 while
the further restriction to those with current income above $30K makes it essentially zero
(with a sample size similar to the A-C speciﬁcation). These results closely track the results
obtained in the corresponding papers: it appears that diﬀerent sample choices played the
crucial role. Compared to these diﬀerences, the eﬀect of excluding older individuals and
those subject to the AMT (cf. the ﬁrst and second panels of Table 5) is minor.26
Splitting the sample according to either current income or the marginal tax rate is
inﬂuenced by transitory and permanent components of income as well as individual eﬀects.
Additionally, splitting the sample according to the level of the tax rate is aﬀected by the
itemization and tax avoidance behavior. If the parameter of interest is constant, the sample
selection bias will be present to the extent that factors determining selection are correlated
with the error term and are not separately controlled for. Were transitory and permanent
components of income and other determinants of selection appropriately controlled for, the
sample selection bias should not be present. In that case, if the underlying parameter of
interest is indeed constant, how the sample is split should not aﬀect the results, contrary
to the results in Table 5. The results in that table suggest a misspeciﬁcation. Although in
principle it is possible that one of such arbitrary restrictions will yield correct results, it is
hard to a priori defend any particular choice.
The decision to split the sample may also be motivated by the belief that the underlying
parameters vary in population. This was likely the implicit motivation of previous research
23Auten and Carroll (1999) report results with log income control only.
24The Auten and Carroll (1999) estimate in the directly comparable speciﬁcation is 0.67.
25Mimicking the speciﬁcation of Gruber and Saez (2002) (Table 4) by using the full panel, their sample
restriction and weighting by income yields the tax coeﬃcient estimate of 0.29 (with the t-statistic of 2.08),
somewhat higher than their estimate of 0.17. A few small changes in the deﬁnition of total income are
responsible for this minor diﬀerence.
26Although not reported here, including current income splines as in the preferred speciﬁcation of Gruber
and Saez (2002) renders tax coeﬃcients in all speciﬁcations in Table 5 insigniﬁcant. With a single diﬀerence
and just one tax change, allowing for nonlinearity in income eliminates income as the source of identiﬁcation.
This is not a problem for Gruber and Saez (2002) and this paper, because with multiple years of data one
need not rely on identiﬁcation oﬀ the cross-sectional variation in tax rates. However, this is the major source
of identiﬁcation in the context of Feldstein (1995) and Auten and Carroll (1999).
17that did not consider the low-income group as a valid control for high-income people who
experienced the largest tax changes. Diﬀerences in behavior of the rich and the poor can
be ascribed to either tastes or technology. In the framework of this paper, taste diﬀerences
are accounted for by allowing for individual eﬀects and thus should not aﬀect the results.
Diﬀerences in available technology are allowed for by controlling for the tax base. The case
for the elasticity of income to vary across diﬀerent groups is therefore weaker than in prior
research. Therefore, I investigate how sensitive are my estimates to the sample selection
and consider stability of estimates as a testable prediction of my approach.
In Table 6, I report estimates of the speciﬁcation with the tax rate using my preferred
speciﬁcation (i.e., controlling separately and nonlinearly for the level of and deviation from
1979 income) and alternative ways of splitting the sample. The estimated elasticity for the
whole sample is .57 while estimates for subsamples are all smaller and usually imprecisely
estimated. However, estimates obtained by splitting the sample using 1979 income are
consistently larger than those obtained by splitting the sample according to the contempo-
raneous income level. Clearly, in each case results remain sensitive to the sample selection
still suggesting a possible speciﬁcation error. The evidence for married individuals is more
supportive, although none of the estimates for subsamples is signiﬁcant.
6 Results — Tax Rate vs. Tax Base
The previous section oﬀers a mechanical explanation for the diﬀerences in results found in
previous papers. Relying on the insights regarding the relevance of sample selection and
income controls, I turn now to the main question of this paper: the impact of the tax base
on reported income.
Table 7 repeats the exercise reported in Table 4 while allowing for both tax rate and tax
base eﬀects. Estimates of the direct tax elasticity are as sensitive to the choice of income
controls as the ones when only the tax rate is controlled for. In every speciﬁcation, the
interaction eﬀect is positive and signiﬁcant, but its value is also sensitive to the choice of
controls. I conclude that allowing for ﬂexible income controls is important and, in what
follows, I allow for splines in both permanent and transitory components.
The main results are shown in Table 8. Estimates for the whole sample indicate that
both direct tax elasticity and tax base eﬀects are important. The direct tax elasticity is
0.441 while the coeﬃcient on γ ln(τ) is 1.04. Evaluated at the average tax base of 0.913 (i.e.,
γ = .087), this corresponds to the tax elasticity of 0.53. In the sample used for estimation,
following the Tax Reform Act of 1986 the average tax base increased from 0.880 in 1985 to
0.927 in 1988, so that γ declined from 0.120 to 0.077. Consequently, the point estimates
imply that the elasticity of broad income at the average tax base fell from 0.57 to 0.52, or
by about 9%.
18For each way of slicing the income distribution, the direct tax elasticity is always in-
signiﬁcant though a little sensitive to the choice of subsample, while the eﬀect of interaction
is usually large and signiﬁcant. Comparing these results to those in Table 6 reveals that
estimates of the direct tax elasticity are usually smaller than those obtained when tax base
eﬀects are ignored. Combined with the interaction eﬀect, however, the implied elasticities
evaluated at the average tax base for the whole sample (which is roughly 0.9, i.e., γ ≈ 0.1)
are always quite close to estimates that ignore the tax base eﬀects. Consequently, the quan-
titative importance of these results lies not in correcting the bias (although it does that as
well), but rather in pointing to the non-structural character of the estimated parameter.
The next two panels of Table 8 show results by marital status. While one might argue
that variation in marital status variations provide an additional source of identiﬁcation, this
is a diﬃcult point to make, because it implies that the same behavioral model applies to
both types of households. Furthermore, single individuals are likely to be predominantly
young and therefore experiencing large changes in income following completion of their
education. Such reasoning led Auten and Carroll (1999) to exclude individuals younger
than 25 from their sample. In the absence of more detailed demographic information (in
particular, having no information about age), I am not able to control for such considerations
explicitly. However, splitting the sample by marital status allows to assess the relevance of
this problem if most of the young individuals are single.
Table 8 reveals that results for single and married individuals are vastly diﬀerent. The
results for the singles are all over the map. While the estimate of the direct tax elasticity
is signiﬁcant and large for the whole sample, it is not signiﬁcant and varies between −0.5
and 1.4 for subsamples. It is very likely that many individuals in this group are working
part-time or entering the labor force while in sample, so that changes in their income are
not tax motivated. Given my inability to control for other demographic characteristics of
these individuals, I believe that results for single individuals are not meaningful.
The results for the sample of married individuals are, however, remarkably stable. The
direct tax elasticities are always insigniﬁcant and close to zero. At the same time, the eﬀect
of the interaction is quite precisely estimated at 0.94 for the full sample and this point
esimate is within one standard error of estimates for each of the considered income groups.
With very few exceptions, income eﬀects are close to zero and insigniﬁcant.
In Table 9, I repeat the same exercise for the full sample and separately for the sample
of married individuals, while controlling for splines in the current income only as in Gruber
and Saez (2002). The results using full sample are in some cases sensitive to this change,
but the results for married individuals are quite consistent with previous conclusions.
Table 10 shows results for restricted subsamples (using both permanent and transitory
splines). The ﬁrst column presents the results obtained when the sample is limited to indi-
viduals who were observed in all years. Estimates for married individuals only are essentially
19identical as those in Table 8. When both married and single individuals are included, the
direct elasticity becomes insigniﬁcant but the interaction eﬀect remains unaﬀected. This
pattern reinforces the impression that unobserved heterogeneity among single individuals
is not appropriately controlled for and strengthens the case for concentrating on the results
for married individuals only.
The following speciﬁcations in Table 10 show the results when the sample is limited to
rely on selected tax changes only. Using only diﬀerences starting between 1980 and 1982
eliminates the Tax Reform Act of 1986 from the analysis, while using 1983-1987 eliminates
the ERTA’81. Results in both cases qualitatively resemble those obtained earlier although
point estimates are sensitive. It should be reminded here that extensive controlling for
income makes identiﬁcation based on a single reform tenuous.
All the speciﬁcations up to this point included years directly adjacent to the reforms.
This is potentially a problem, because income in these years may reﬂect short-term re-timing
responses. In principle, such responses should be controlled for by my strategy for dealing
with the impact of transitory shocks and should not aﬀect the results. As an alternative
and an informal speciﬁcation check, the ﬁfth speciﬁcation limits the sample to just two
three-year diﬀerences: 1980-1983 and 1985-1988 that span both major tax reforms, but do
not include years immediately before or after them. It is comforting to see that these results
are essentially identical as the results based on the full sample (although standard errors
are predictably larger).
The last two speciﬁcations show the results using either only 1980-1983 or 1985-1988
diﬀerences. None of the tax elasticities are signiﬁcant anymore. These results suggest
that the eﬀect is diﬃcult to identify based on a single reform, and moreover it probably
cannot be identiﬁed at all without a few years of data: without multiple tax law changes,
conditional on permanent and transitory income measures there is very little variation in
the instruments left.
7 Discussion and Implications
I interpret the results as indicating that apart from the diﬃculty to control for transitory
and permanent shocks in income, previous studies suﬀered from two additional problems.
First, the model was mis-speciﬁed due to ignoring the eﬀect of the tax base. Second, the
results indicate that mixing individuals with diﬀerent marital status while identifying the
eﬀect of taxes on income is suspect (at least, given scarce demographic information).
Tables 8, 9 and 10 contain the major results. Results for married individuals are con-
sistent across all considered speciﬁcations: the direct eﬀect of the tax rate is small and
insigniﬁcant while the interaction term is in most cases of the order of 0.9 and comfortably
signiﬁcant. The results based on the full sample are not reliable, although they also appear
20to indicate that the interaction term plays an important role. Therefore, I concentrate on
the results for married individuals in developing normative implications of the results. I
use the results for all married individuals, i.e., the ﬁrst speciﬁcation in the second panel of
Table 8. The estimated direct tax elasticity is 0.086 while the estimated eﬀect of the inter-
action with the tax base is 0.942. These results imply that an individual who has no access
to any deductions would not respond to changes in the tax rates. The more deductions are
available, the stronger the response.
Are these results reasonable? As highlighted by the theoretical model, the strength of
estimated response reﬂects the degree of substitutability of broad income and deductible
commodities. The estimated coeﬃcient indicates that broad income and deductible com-
modities are strong substitutes: a decrease in the price of deductible commodities (higher
tax rate) leads to a signiﬁcant reduction in the level of broad income. Thus, for example, the
results are consistent with lower prices of charitable contributions or medical care leading
to less labor supply and, therefore, less income reported on the tax return.
As Table 2 shows, the mean marginal tax rate for fell from 0.212 in 1985 to 0.184 in
1988, while the mean average tax base increased from 0.880 to 0.927. The estimated results
suggest therefore that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced the elasticity of reported income
to the tax rate at the mean tax base from 0.199 to 0.155.27 There are two reasons for the
change. First, the tax reform had a mechanical eﬀect on the tax base, absent behavioral
response. Second, under the new tax environment taxpayers adjusted their behavior and,
consequently, there has been some endogenous change in the tax base. The last eﬀect could
be present even if only tax rates changed but it would have been ignored by the standard
analysis.
One simple implication of this result can be described by using the marginal cost of






where t is the marginal tax rate and π is the elasticity of taxable income. I proceed by
replacing π by the estimate of the reported income elasticity at the mean: ε+¯ γβ . Evaluating
this formula at the mean tax rates yields the 1985 value of the MCF of 1.057 and the 1988
value of 1.036.
Interpreting these numbers, they imply that the social cost of collecting a dollar of
revenue fell by 2 cents per dollar. Alternatively, given estimated null income response, it
directly translates into a reduction in the marginal excess burden by 36%, from 0.057 cents
per dollar to 0.036. Holding the tax base constant at the initial level, the same change
in the marginal tax rate would have reduced the MCF to just 1.047, resulting in the 50%
27I ﬁnd no evidence to conclude that the income eﬀect is diﬀerent from zero, so that compensated and
uncompensated income elasticities are assumed to be equal.
21smaller excess burden reduction. While these are not deﬁnitive calculations, they illustrate
the potential quantitative importance of understanding the role of non-tax instruments in
evaluating the eﬃciency cost of tax policy.
These results also indicate that the elasticity of reported income may well be diﬀerent
for diﬀerent groups, to the extent that their tax bases are diﬀerent. The results in Table 8
indicate (using the average tax base in each group and the estimates for the full married
sample) that the elasticity of income for people below the $30,000 threshold was 0.157
while the corresponding elasticity for people with incomes above $100,000 was 0.285. These
diﬀerences are much smaller than estimated by Gruber and Saez (2002). Even though they
still systematically vary with income, they do not necessarily imply that tax rates at high
incomes need to be adjusted to account for stronger behavioral response: the diﬀerences in
elasticities are themselves a function of policy.
To be sure, there are complicating factors that are in no way addressed in this paper
and that may be very relevant. To the extent that the estimated response merely reﬂects
shifting from other tax bases such as the corporate or capital gains tax, the elasticity of
reported income should be supplemented by losses or gains of revenue from other sources.
Accounting for such responses could undermine calculations performed above.
Additionally, the elasticity of income determines only the cost of taxation, while any
complete analysis of policy requires understanding beneﬁts as well. There may be trade-
oﬀs involved in the choice of tax base to the extent that deductions from the tax base are
socially beneﬁcial on, for example, redistributive grounds. Also, a broader tax base may
feature diﬀerent administrative costs (Yitzhaki, 1979; Wilson, 1989).
The response estimated in this paper reﬂects the response of broad income rather than
its taxable component: what is estimated is the elasticity of B rather than γB. A proper
estimation of the response of taxable income would require accounting for changes in its
deﬁnition on the left-hand side of the estimated relationship. A more complex econometric
framework that models, inter alia, itemization decision is necessary for that. There is,
however, evidence that at least some of deductions (e.g., charitable contributions) respond
strongly to tax rates. By eliminating such responsive components from the tax base, the
elasticity of taxable income can be reduced beyond the eﬀect analyzed in this paper but,
while they remain taxable, the elasticity of taxable income is likely higher than the broad
income elasticity. For that reason, caution should be exercised in interpreting the results
in this paper as providing the complete measure of the cost of taxation. Estimating the
taxable income elasticity directly should be an interesting area for future research.
The bottom line is that any analysis of the cost of taxation should not ignore the fact that
the crucial elasticity of taxable income is endogenous to the size of the tax base and, more
generally, to other aspects of tax system. Putting these results in a broader perspective, this
paper lends empirical support for the theoretical ideas advanced by e.g., Mayshar (1991);
22Slemrod (1994); Kopczuk (2001); Slemrod (2001) and Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002). The
cost of taxation is not merely a function of marginal tax rates, consumer preferences and
technology, but rather it crucially depends on a broader tax environment and the structure
of tax policy. Therefore, economic analysis of the optimal tax policy has to incorporate tax
avoidance and administration.
Finally, the non-tax-rate eﬀect stressed in this paper can be relevant for any analysis
of the eﬀects of taxation on other economic variables. As a general lesson, one should be
careful in making the standard assumption that tax reforms are natural experiments that
can be used to identify the eﬀect of taxation on economic variables. Such exercises usually
assume that the elasticity of response is constant, while major changes in the tax system
are likely to invalidate this assumption: tax elasticities are fundamentally non-structural
parameters. As demonstrated here, acknowledging this issue does not necessarily eliminate
usability of tax reforms as a source of variation, but it calls for a more comprehensive
account of the changes that they induce.
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25A Data.
The dataset used is the panel extract of the SOI Tax Model collection of individual income tax re-
turns available from the University of Michigan Oﬃce of Tax Policy Research. The documentation
of this dataset can be found online at http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/iit-docs/. The deﬁnition
of broad income includes wages, dividends and interest income (with excluded components), un-
employment income, pensions, annuities, IRA distributions, alimony received, state tax refunds,
partnership and S-corporation income, Schedule C income, farm income, rental income and royal-
ties, and other income. Capital gains are not included. Passive losses are added back because they
are not consistently observable before and after TRA’86. Income adjustments and total deductions
include all items reported on the tax returns. The marginal tax rates are obtained by applying the
TAXSIM calculator to the actual AGI (including capital gains and reduced by non-itemizer deduc-
tion for charitable contributions between 1982 and 1986), total itemized deductions and claimed
exemptions. The tax base 1 − γ is computed as the ratio of broad income less total adjustments
and total deductions (excluding state and local income tax deduction but including non-itemizer
charitable contribution deduction) over broad income. Low income individuals with no tax liability
who do not claim any deductions have the tax base of 1.
Not all variables from the tax returns are present for all years. Some eﬀort was undertaken to
correct certain missing values. Past state of residence, if known, was used if state of residence is
missing. Standard deduction was used to recover age and blindness status if missing. Total Schedule
E income is missing in 1981 but can be constructed from its components. Royalty and rental income
are not available in 1987 but can be approximated based on other Schedule E variables.
While constructing instruments, all variables were inﬂated using the three-year CPI change. The
predicted marginal tax rate was computed by applying the TAXSIM calculator for the second year in
the pair to broad income, total adjustments and deductions recalculated using the new deﬁnition, and
claimed exemptions. Capital gains were not included. The results are not sensitive to the inclusion
of capital gains and to not adjusting deductions. The predicted tax base was calculated by ﬁrst
recalculating total adjustments and total deductions using the new deﬁnition and then calculating
the ratio as before. Changes in the tax base that were accounted for include changes in the threshold
for medical deduction, changes in the deduction for health insurance, changes in the rules governing
deductibility of personal interest expenses following TRA’86, changes in the threshold for theft and
casualty loss deduction, changes in the non-itemizer charitable contribution deduction, changes in
the IRA deduction and changing status of moving cost income adjustment to a deduction following
TRA’86. The computed predicted value of deductions was compared to the new standard deduction
to determine predicted itemization status. For individuals before 1984 who were predicted to change
their status to non-itemizers, the non-itemizer charitable deduction was instead allowed for. The
total and predicted tax liability used in constructing the instrument for income eﬀects was taken
from the corresponding TAXSIM results.
26Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Current Income (1992 dollars) 44815 61322 41442
Income in 1979 (1992 dollars) 40742 34665 41442
Single 0.324 0.468 41442
Male 0.859 0.348 41442
Itemizers 0.516 0.500 41442
t1 0.264 0.111 41442
t2 0.247 0.101 41442
1 − γ1 0.864 0.164 41442
1 − γ2 0.866 0.165 41442
∆ln(B) 0.038 0.625 41442
∆ln(τ) 0.026 0.122 41442
∆ln(τP) 0.032 0.058 41442
∆γ ln(τ) 0.005 0.040 41442
∆γP ln(τP) 0.009 0.019 41442
∆ln(X) 0.043 0.578 41388
∆ln(XP) 0.011 0.059 41425
τ denotes the marginal tax rate. 1 − γ is the tax base. B represents broad income and X is equal to
broad income less the tax liability. Subscripts i = 1,2 refer to the ﬁrst and second year in each three-
year diﬀerence. The “P” superscripts mark instruments (predicted values of variables) as deﬁned in text.
Deﬁnitions of other variables are as follows: ∆ln(B) = ln(B2/B1), ∆ln(τ) = ln(τ2/τ1) ∆ln(τ
P) = ln(τ
P/τ1),
∆γ ln(τ) = γ2 ln(τ2)−γ1 ln(τ1) and ∆γ
P ln(τ




includes all 3-year diﬀerences used for estimation.
27Table 2: Means of Selected Variables by Year of Filing
Share Tax Base
Year Number t 1 − γ t(1 − γ) Item. Item. N-Item.
1979 45393 0.225 0.926 0.205 0.284 0.762 0.991
1980 45781 0.234 0.920 0.213 0.306 0.760 0.990
1981 46250 0.243 0.913 0.219 0.328 0.756 0.990
1982 9445 0.229 0.897 0.203 0.350 0.735 0.984
1983 18833 0.216 0.891 0.190 0.363 0.731 0.982
1984 9862 0.213 0.884 0.186 0.384 0.729 0.981
1985 19878 0.212 0.880 0.184 0.390 0.724 0.980
1986 10285 0.211 0.874 0.182 0.388 0.720 0.972
1987 21002 0.191 0.919 0.174 0.338 0.776 0.992
1988 21553 0.184 0.927 0.170 0.292 0.770 0.992
1989 22031 0.185 0.928 0.170 0.287 0.767 0.993
1990 21977 0.184 0.922 0.169 0.288 0.756 0.989
Summary 292290 0.215 0.913 0.195 0.325 0.753 0.988
Deﬁnitions of variables are as in Table 1. All observations present in the dataset (not just those used in the
estimation) are used.
28Table 3: Means of Selected Variables by Year of Filing.
N Item. ∆ln(B) ∆ln(τ) ∆ln(τP) ∆γ ln(τ) ∆γP ln(τP)
1979-1982 5277 0.358 0.086 -0.016 -0.016 -0.011 -0.001
(0.480) (0.724) (0.135) (0.042) (0.037) (0.009)
1980-1983 9286 0.413 0.048 0.025 0.024 -0.008 0.004
(0.492) (0.679) (0.128) (0.042) (0.037) (0.013)
1981-1984 4322 0.459 0.034 0.046 0.043 -0.006 0.007
(0.498) (0.643) (0.128) (0.048) (0.040) (0.017)
1982-1985 4057 0.496 0.058 0.019 0.025 -0.004 0.005
(0.500) (0.634) (0.122) (0.036) (0.036) (0.011)
1983-1986 3827 0.521 0.073 -0.003 0.007 -0.008 0.002
(0.500) (0.635) (0.120) (0.030) (0.039) (0.010)
1984-1987 3631 0.563 0.053 0.025 0.047 0.018 0.014
(0.496) (0.633) (0.120) (0.060) (0.038) (0.022)
1985-1988 6867 0.586 0.025 0.041 0.052 0.024 0.019
(0.493) (0.610) (0.118) (0.076) (0.040) (0.024)
1986-1989 3278 0.595 0.014 0.040 0.054 0.028 0.022
(0.491) (0.574) (0.119) (0.078) (0.043) (0.027)
1987-1990 6174 0.573 0.009 0.012 0.013 0.003 0.006
(0.495) (0.548) (0.110) (0.054) (0.032) (0.018)
Summary 46719 0.498 0.044 0.021 0.026 0.003 0.008
(0.500) (0.637) (0.124) (0.058) (0.040) (0.019)
Columns show mean diﬀerences of variables. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. Sample includes all
3-year diﬀerences used for estimation and 1979-1982 observations selected using the same rule. Deﬁnitions
of variables are as in Table 1.
29Table 4: Tax Rate IV Regressions Using Diﬀerent Approaches to Controlling for Permanent
and Transitory Components of Income
∆ln(τ) T-value
Full Sample
No income controls -0.80 -10.99
Logarithm of current income 1.44 10.19
Splines of log current income 0.21 1.89
Logarithm of 1979 income -0.32 -3.71
Splines of log of 1979 income -0.59 -7.14
Deviation of log current income from log 1979 income -0.52 -6.47
Splines of the above -0.45 -5.75
Log of 1979 income and log of deviation from it 1.37 9.90
Log of 1979 income and splines of deviations 0.93 7.46
Splines of log of 1979 income and log of deviation 0.89 7.24
Splines of log of 1979 income and splines of log-deviations 0.57 4.89




No income controls -0.34 -4.10
Logarithm of current income 0.90 6.34
Splines of log current income 0.12 1.07
Logarithm of 1979 income -0.25 -2.66
Splines of log of 1979 income -0.32 -3.41
Deviation of log current income from log 1979 income 0.03 0.36
Splines of the above -0.06 -0.66
Log of 1979 income and log of deviation from it 0.76 5.76
Log of 1979 income and splines of deviations 0.32 2.75
Splines of log of 1979 income and log of deviation 0.62 4.86
Splines of log of 1979 income and splines of log-deviations 0.26 2.26
Splines of log of 1979 income and yearly splines of log-
deviations
0.26 2.26
Sample size is 41,442 for the full sample and 28,025 for the sample of married individuals (1979-1982 pair
is excluded). All regressions include gender and marital status (where applicable), as well as the full set of
year dummies. “Splines” refer to a ﬂexible piecewise linear functional form (10 components). The tax rate
instrument is described in the text.
30Table 5: Tax Rate IV Regressions — Sensitivity to Sample Selection Using 1985-1988 Data
and Previous Methodology
Restricted Sample (A+C) Full Sample (G+S)
All A+C G+S G+S 30K All A+C G+S G+S 30K
1985-1988 Only
∆ln(τ) 2.343 .882 .387 .011 2.721 .845 .347 .0008
(.263)∗∗ (.237)∗∗ (.199) (.191) (.237)∗∗ (.205)∗∗ (.167)∗ (.161)
ln(B) -.503 -.115 -.127 .009 -.488 -.108 -.081 .014
(.022)∗∗ (.027)∗∗ (.02)∗∗ (.025) (.021)∗∗ (.025)∗∗ (.017)∗∗ (.024)
N 11280 5203 9052 5659 13621 5982 11073 6513
The restricted sample excludes couples with at least one age or blindness exemption and subject to the
AMT (for comparability with Auten and Carroll (1999) and Gruber and Saez (2002)). Compared to other
speciﬁcations in this paper, this sample does not exclude individuals who are not observed in 1979, those
ﬁling as the “head of households” or those with non-positive 1979 income. The speciﬁcation marked: (1) “all”
does not impose additional restrictions; (2) A+C removes taxpayers with federal tax rate below 22%; (3)
G+S eliminates taxpayers with total income below 10,000 (1992 dollars) (4) G+S 30K eliminates taxpayers
with total income below 30,000 (1992 dollars). All regressions include gender and marital status (where
applicable), as well as the full set of year dummies.
31Table 6: Tax Rate IV Regressions — Sensitivity to Sample Selection Using Controls for
Permanent and Transitory Income Components
Current income 1979 income
NR > 10K > 30K < 30K > 10K > 30K > 50K > 100K
Full Sample
∆ln(τ) .568 .195 .083 .434 .306 .244 .376 .258
(.116)∗∗ (.101) (.107) (.237) (.11)∗∗ (.119)∗ (.147)∗ (.265)
N 41442 37295 25180 17158 35627 24284 12602 1529
Married Individuals
∆ln(τ) .259 .157 .035 -.088 .205 .165 .254 .254
(.115)∗ (.108) (.113) (.249) (.113) (.121) (.141) (.262)
N 28025 27361 21954 6066 27509 21959 12078 1448
Single Individuals
∆ln(τ) 1.113 .244 .121 1.046 .634 .410 1.031 1.522
(.335)∗∗ (.275) (.369) (.456)∗ (.355) (.442) (.791) (2.309)
N 13417 9934 3226 11092 8118 2325 524 81
All regressions include gender and marital status (where applicable), as well as the full set of year dummies.
10-piece linear splines in 1979 income and in deviation of the current income for 1979 income are used.
Instruments as described in text.
32Table 7: Tax Rate and Tax Base IV Regressions — Sensitivity to Sample Selection Using
Controls for Permanent and Transitory Income Components
∆ln(τ) T-val ∆γ ln(τ) T-val ∆ln(X) T-val
Full Sample
No income controls -0.86 -9.06 0.53 2.19 0.08 0.54
Logarithm of current income 1.18 4.53 2.02 5.58 -0.02 -0.14
Splines of log current income 0.04 0.40 0.70 3.11 0.10 1.47
Logarithm of 1979 income -0.47 -5.96 0.94 3.43 0.08 0.54
Splines of log of 1979 income -0.68 -8.07 0.65 2.55 0.07 0.52
Deviation of log current in-
come from log 1979 income
-0.60 -7.24 0.51 2.09 0.03 0.25
Splines of the above -0.54 -6.93 0.65 2.97 0.04 0.59
Log of 1979 income and log of
deviation from it
1.17 4.73 1.89 5.48 -0.04 -0.29
Log of 1979 income and splines
of deviation
0.70 4.13 1.61 5.71 0.01 0.05
Splines of log of 1979 income
and log of deviation
0.81 4.30 1.30 4.25 -0.06 -0.51
Splines of log of 1979 income
and splines of log-deviations
0.44 3.15 1.06 4.08 0.01 0.13
Splines of log 1979 income and
yearly splines of log-deviations
0.41 3.04 0.97 3.73 0.04 0.49
Married Individuals Only
No income controls -0.42 -5.28 0.42 1.51 0.10 0.52
Logarithm of current income 0.59 2.77 1.45 3.81 0.08 0.53
Splines of log current income -0.10 -1.09 0.92 4.02 0.19 3.06
Logarithm of 1979 income -0.35 -4.08 0.50 1.75 0.10 0.53
Splines of log of 1979 income -0.41 -4.75 0.51 1.76 0.09 0.44
Deviation of log current in-
come from log 1979 income
-0.09 -0.83 0.65 2.26 0.05 0.36
Splines of the above -0.18 -2.07 0.62 2.61 0.11 1.80
Log of 1979 income and log of
deviation from it
0.53 2.91 1.31 3.81 0.05 0.38
Log of 1979 income and splines
of deviation
0.13 1.16 0.94 3.70 0.11 1.75
Splines of log of 1979 income
and log of deviation
0.45 2.55 1.28 3.70 0.01 0.07
Splines of log of 1979 income
and splines of log-deviations
0.09 0.78 0.94 3.67 0.10 1.55
Splines of log 1979 income and
yearly splines of log-deviations
0.08 0.75 0.89 3.45 0.12 1.87
33Table 8: Tax Rate and Tax Base IV Regressions Using Controls for Permanent and Tran-
sitory Income Components
Current income 1979 income
NR > 10K > 30K < 30K > 10K > 30K > 50K > 100K
∆ln(τ) .441 .150 .091 .410 .219 .109 .162 -.028
(.139)∗∗ (.115) (.123) (.293) (.124) (.117) (.133) (.214)
∆γ ln(τ) 1.045 .528 .613 .997 .771 .890 .902 .712
(.26)∗∗ (.231)∗ (.279)∗ (.664) (.26)∗∗ (.255)∗∗ (.313)∗∗ (.411)
∆ln(X) .010 .014 -.067 -.036 .003 .061 .114 .255
(.082) (.084) (.104) (.154) (.084) (.079) (.078) (.075)∗∗
N 41388 37248 25143 17147 35578 24241 12574 1517
¯ γ .128 .139 .167 .076 .143 .174 .194 .211
Married Individuals
∆ln(τ) .086 .046 -.020 -.232 .049 .044 .096 .022
(.11) (.106) (.115) (.192) (.108) (.119) (.132) (.226)
∆γ ln(τ) .942 .713 .793 .896 .867 .889 .889 .670
(.257)∗∗ (.234)∗∗ (.267)∗∗ (.616) (.26)∗∗ (.27)∗∗ (.329)∗∗ (.452)
∆ln(X) .099 .098 .015 .282 .094 .043 .077 .191
(.064) (.068) (.092) (.103)∗∗ (.066) (.085) (.088) (.094)∗
N 27978 27319 21919 6058 27464 21920 12051 1436
¯ γ .164 .167 .175 .118 .165 .179 .194 .212
Single Individuals
∆ln(τ) 1.364 .414 .384 1.43 1.126 .171 .184 -.530
(.573)∗ (.388) (.483) (.806) (.656) (.384) (.622) (.975)
∆γ ln(τ) .811 -.171 -.682 .704 .042 .855 1.321 2.730
(.837) (.634) (.723) (1.165) (.819) (.767) (1.13) (1.983)
∆ln(X) -.153 -.148 -.172 -.22 -.313 .213 .31 .633
(.208) (.171) (.175) (.248) (.247) (.155) (.136)∗ (.079)∗∗
N 13410 9929 3224 11089 8114 2321 523 81
¯ γ .07 .084 .127 .054 .091 .141 .183 .197
All regressions include gender and marital status (where applicable), as well as the full set of year dummies.
10-piece linear splines in 1979 income and in deviation of the current income for 1979 income are used.
Instruments as described in text.
34Table 9: Tax Rate and Tax Base IV Regressions Using Splines in Current Income
Current income 1979 income
NR > 10K > 30K < 30K > 10K > 30K > 50K > 100K
∆ln(τ) .044 .026 .034 .047 .003 .022 .066 -.099
(.106) (.105) (.118) (.241) (.105) (.108) (.125) (.207)
∆γ ln(τ) .692 .522 .626 .194 .719 .884 .845 .711
(.227)∗∗ (.217)∗ (.271)∗ (.565) (.237)∗∗ (.239)∗∗ (.295)∗∗ (.392)
∆ln(X) .104 .065 -.047 .03 .095 .132 .143 .272
(.072) (.08) (.106) (.118) (.078) (.076) (.071)∗ (.07)∗∗
N 41388 37248 25143 17147 35578 24241 12574 1517
Married Individuals
∆ln(τ) -.101 -.079 -.09 -.263 -.141 -.048 -.004 -.062
(.094) (.097) (.107) (.191) (.093) (.109) (.121) (.216)
∆γ ln(τ) .918 .730 .812 .935 .877 .883 .826 .658
(.229)∗∗ (.215)∗∗ (.247)∗∗ (.572) (.233)∗∗ (.25)∗∗ (.303)∗∗ (.429)
∆ln(X) .189 .152 .064 .317 .177 .125 .131 .214
(.062)∗∗ (.062)∗ (.087) (.104)∗∗ (.065)∗∗ (.086) (.077) (.092)∗
N 27978 27319 21919 6058 27464 21920 12051 1436
All regressions include gender and marital status (where applicable), as well as the full set of year dummies.
10-piece linear splines in current income is used. Instruments as described in text.
35Table 10: Tax Rate and Tax Base IV Regressions — Subsamples
Balanced Diﬀerence with the initial year in...
panel 1980-1982 1983-1987 1980 and 1985 1980 1985
Full sample
∆ln(τ) .213 .086 .535 .407 -.023 1.008
(.158) (.17) (.174)∗∗ (.199)∗ (.181) (.735)
∆γ ln(τ) .935 .998 .814 .948 .643 .911
(.289)∗∗ (.531) (.281)∗∗ (.388)∗ (.72) (.724)
∆ln(X) -.01 .031 .068 .072 .198 -.295
(.105) (.119) (.081) (.115) (.085)∗ (.548)
N 24649 17653 23735 16136 9280 6856
Married individuals
∆ln(τ) -.027 -.063 .064 .179 -.075 .076
(.126) (.154) (.134) (.214) (.202) (.299)
∆γ ln(τ) .969 1.273 .62 .922 .665 .508
(.269)∗∗ (.558)∗ (.266)∗ (.465)∗ (.811) (.528)
∆ln(X) .105 .092 .167 .039 .187 .106
(.07) (.134) (.062)∗∗ (.216) (.176) (.314)
N 18091 11431 16547 10689 5891 4798
All regressions include gender and marital status (where applicable), as well as the full set of year dummies.
10-piece linear splines in 1979 income and in deviation of the current income for 1979 income are used.
Instruments as described in text.
36Figure 1: Distribution of the Actual and Predicted Tax Bases in 1985 and 1988
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37Figure 2: Distribution of the Average Tax Base in 1980, 1982, 1985 and 1988
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